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When we make decisions we are invariably comparing outcomes that happen at dif-
ferent times. How much should you sacrifice now to get a better job later? Should you
switch to solar? Purchase a gym membership? Studies of intertemporal decision-making
suggest that we often exhibit two types of time preferences: future discounting, that all
else being equal, we prefer that future pleasures happen sooner than later (and vice versa
for pains); and past discounting, that all else being equal, we prefer that pleasures happen
in the present or future than in the past (and again, vice versa for pains).1
Are these time preferences rational? It’s important that we make progress on this
question, for assumptions about what discounting is normatively optimal inform public
policy decisions throughout the world. Both social science and philosophy discuss the
normative standing of discounting, philosophy focusing mostly on past discounting and
social science mostly on future discounting. To a very rough first approximation, the two
fields appear to disagree on when or if temporal discounting is rational. Future discount-
ing is judged irrational by philosophers and as often rational by social scientists. Past
discounting, by contrast, is viewed as rational by some philosophers but as (probably)
irrational by social scientists.
Are the two fields really in disagreement? Part of the problem in determining if
this is so is that they speak different languages about discounting. With the goal of
bridging this divide, I want to focus on the fact that both time preferences are typically
tensed in nature. This point is often obscured, so I think it’s important to highlight it
independently of the present interest. Through the lens of tense, we’ll see that the conflict
between social science and philosophy on discounting is mostly only apparent; and where
genuine, it involves disputes within each field as much as between fields. Although I will
not solve the question of whether discounting for tense is rational, keeping an eye on
tense will allow us to make several novel observations, observations that I hope will help
us better understand temporal discounting.
1Terminological confusion reigns over these two asymmetries. Many philosophers call future discounting
“near bias” and past discounting “future bias”. Since the topic of this paper is in part whether these
preferences are biases, understood in a prejudicial way, I use more neutral terminology.
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1 Background
Examples of future discounting include common preferences such as wanting to treat
oneself to dinner tonight rather than wait until next week and preferring that the dentist
trip happen next week instead of today. Social scientists have studied this kind of dis-
counting in thousands of articles and experiments. The hope is to eventually intervene
on many types of unfortunate individual and social outcomes, such as lack of saving,
unhealthy eating habits, poor financial decisions, and addiction. In the paradigm that
has developed, economists hold that future discounting can be rational, so long as it
takes a special form, namely, exponential discounting (explained below). Psychologists
and behavioral economics then point out that our actual discounting is typically sub-
optimal; they often try to find functions – often called “hyperbolic” even if not strictly
hyperbolic – that fit the experimental data. Philosophers by contrast commonly dismiss
future discounting as irrational, even obviously irrational.2
The situation is a bit the reverse with past discounting. Examples of past discounting
include the familiar feeling that once an experience has happened, it is over and done, no
longer an object of as much concern. Social scientists have not paid much attention to this
type of discounting, but in philosophy it has received attention ever since Derek Parfit
posed thought experiments that elicit in many people strong intuitions in favor of trading
some small future pain for much greater past pain (Parfit 1984). Philosophers divide
about whether past discounting is rational. So-called temporal neutralists (explained in
Section 4) hold that one should not take temporal perspective into account when deciding
the best location of goods and harms across a lifetime. Parfit himself is not entirely clear
where he falls, but he is usually taken to be a non-neutralist, holding that past discounting
is rational. Social scientists don’t engage much with this kind of discounting because they
think it is irrelevant to practical decisions. We’ll see that if judged by the standard that
they employ for future discounting then they would deem past discounting irrational.3
It seems like we have a clash between two traditions. Philosophers typically regard fu-
ture discounting as irrational and put their energy into deciding whether past discounting
is; by contrast, social scientists think a type of future discounting is rational and ignore
past discounting.
2For a history of this literature, see Loewe 2006 and Peart 2000, and for some philosophical connections,
see Żuradzki 2016. For a sample of its application, see Story et al 2014. Classic economic treatments
of future discounting include Samuelson 1937, Ramsey 1928, Strotz 1955, and Koopmans 1960. For
work in psychology challenging the standard economic model’s descriptive accuracy, Thaler 1981
and Loewenstein and Prelec 1992 are classics, and Urminsky and Zauberman 2016 is an excellent
review. There are scores of philosophers who hold that future discounting is irrational; for a sample
see Ahmed 2018, Brink 2015, Bykvist 2015, Parfit 1984, Sullivan 2018, and against some of them,
Dorsey 2017.
3The first empirical study of past discounting of which I’m aware is Caruso, E., Gilbert, D. and Wilson,
T. 2008. As I write there are many empirical studies coming out in the “experimental philosophy”
tradition that probe many of the claims often made about past discounting; see (e.g.) Lee et al 2020
and Greene et al 2020 for an entry into this literature. Lee et al 2020 report that the preference Parfit
notices is not as strong as is often thought. For philosophical discussion, see Brink 2011, Bykvist
2015, Fernandes 2019, Hare 2015, Maclaurin and Dyke 2002, Parfit 1984 and Suhler and Callender
2012, as well as papers in this volume by Green et al and Lee and McCormack.
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To make progress on understanding this apparent disagreement, I want to draw the
reader’s attention to the little-noticed fact that both types of time preference are typically
tensed in nature. When we conceptualize time, we can characterize temporal relation-
ships either in a tensed or tenseless manner. When we classify events in a tensed way, we
identify whether they are past, present, or future; when we classify them in a tenseless
manner, we instead place them in a sequence ordered by the the earlier than relation.
Over a century ago McTaggart 1908 dubbed the first conceptualization using {past,
present, future} an A-series and the second using {earlier than, later than, simultaneous
with} a B-series. Meanwhile in semantics and cognitive linguistics the first is sometimes
called deictic time, referring to its need for a deictic center, the Now, which is typically
the time of utterance, and the second is often called sequence time. An easy way to
tell the difference between the two conceptualizations is that tensed expressions change
truth value depending on when they are said, whereas tenseless expressions do not. For
instance, “I will see comet Neowise” was true only before I saw it but false afterward,
whereas “the assassination of Lincoln is before that of Kennedy” is always true.4
Past discounting is manifestly tensed. When an event is over and done, what has
happened is that the event has become past. It is not merely that the event is earlier
than another. In Prior’s famous 1959 discussion of thanking goodness that one’s headache
is over, what one thanks goodness for is not that the headache is earlier than another
event but that it is past. That a future headache is earlier than its cessation doesn’t make
us dread it less. In terms of discounting, the pain of the headache is discounted as soon
as it becomes past.5 This kind of discounting is intuitively very strong for many objects
and experiences.
Future discounting is also typically tensed. While duration – say, a decade – is tense-
less, future discounting is usually tensed because the distance is usually measured from
the present evaluation point. There is a difference between wanting something earlier
and wanting something closer to the present. In the paradigm temporal discounting ex-
periment, for instance, the subject is asked whether they would prefer a smaller-sooner
reward to a larger-later reward. Suppose that they are asked in 2020 about rewards
delivered in 2021 and 2022. If they prefer smaller-sooner, say, it is usually not because
4Here I’m following the slightly confused tradition of extending the linguistic category of tense to
describe mental states like preferences. Syntactically tense is a grammatical device that locates
events in the past, present or future. In English, for example, it is often associated with the inflection
of verbs, such as was, is and will be. That is analogous to but not the same as the distinction used
here, which is probably better captured by the deictic versus sequential time distinction. Arguably,
both tensed and tenseless states represent events as standing in a two place temporal ordering relation
(earlier, later, simultaneous). That requires two events. “Tenseless” descriptions mention both events
overtly. Tensed descriptions mention only one relatum overtly, and allow the other to be filled by
a contextual parameter (e.g. the utterance/thought/tokening event). The issue is really whether
the event information in the underlying mental representation is overt or covert (and contextually
supplied). Viewed in this manner, the tenseless/tensed distinction is just one instance of a far more
general phenomenon. See footnote 7 for an example where this point matters.
5Here I make no claim about the form of the past discounting function, assuming one can fit the data.
It may be that all else being equal I care less about more distant past headaches than less distant past
ones, e.g., that I care less about headaches that occurred two years ago than last year. Introspection
isn’t clear, I think. See Lee et al 2020 and Greene et al 2020.
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they have some sort of fixation on the calendar date 2021 and want goods then; rather,
it is because 2021 happens to be just one year from now. In the social science literature
this is the reason why future discounting is often called delay discounting. How long are
you willing to delay the receipt of some goods? The delay is measured with respect to
the present evaluation point. The question asked is: how much time from now will you
wait for goods? That is tensed.
Above I hedge and say “typically” this discounting is tensed because it might be that
you do care about goods being delivered on some particular calendar date. Suppose you
want flowers delivered on your tenth wedding anniversary. Your care about them declines
sharply if delivered afterwards. Discounting like this is perfectly natural. Philosophers
tend to disregard such “impure” temporal preferences, ones motivated by the significance
of that calendar date and not about time itself. But one could also have a “pure” time
preference for a gift arriving on a particular calendar date due to, say, some strange fetish
for goods on that date. In the Humean tradition, where preferences are not criticized
except when they form inconsistent sets, such a preference is permissible. In both cases
the preference is tenseless. The economic framework for discounting can handle tenseless
preference, as we’ll see; however, the type of discounting one normally studies and cares
about in social science is the tensed version. And in philosophy tenseless preferences like
these are not viewed as a threat to temporal neutrality, so often they are dismissed.
Since philosophers mostly concentrate on past discounting and ignore distance-dependent
features, the tense of temporal discounting is obvious. Because this type of discounting
is mostly ignored in social science, however, and because the discussion is dominated by
the question of the form of the distance-dependent discounting curve, tense tends to be
hidden in this field. Let’s now try to find it. Once found, we’ll see how it disappears
(and maybe returns). By following the trail of tense, we’ll see that philosophers and so-
cial scientisst don’t disagree about temporal discounting as much as initial appearences
suggest.
2 The Fate of Tense in Discounted Utility Theory
The standard way of treating future discounting in modern economics arises from Paul
Samuelson’s 1937 exponential discounted utility theory (EDU). Though the model has
been controversial for almost its entire life, it is still commonly used in cost benefit
analyses and can fairly be considered the mainstream account of temporal discounting.
Samuelson explicitly considered and dismissed a normative interpretation of EDU. He
did not think one should discount according to EDU; he mainly felt that simplicity and
usefulness recommended it. Another founder of EDU, Ramsey 1928, also rejected a
normative understanding of its permitted temporal discounting.
It wasn’t until the seminal work of Strotz 1955 that EDU gained its normative interpre-
tation. Strotz shows that if one discounts according to any non-EDU-endorsed schedule,
one can suffer preference reversals that make one in principle exploitable. Because being
in principle exploitable is the cardinal sin of modern economics and rational choice the-
ory, Strotz’s result placed EDU on a normative pedestal, a place where it has remained
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(even if Strotz himself advanced a non-EDU account).
Work in psychology and behavioral economics challenge this framework by showing
that it isn’t descriptively accurate. People don’t actually discount according to EDU.
Given the normative standing accorded EDU, people are thus interpreted as yielding
to irrational preferences, preferences that predictably lead to poor individual and social
outcomes. All of this is controversial, but it is the conventional understanding.6
How does EDU treat time? Discussions are sometimes fairly coarse, failing to make
important distinctions. Fortunately, Strotz himself is admirably clear, so we’ll begin with
this canonical source.
2.1 Strotz, Time and Consistency
Discounted utility theory is an extension of expected utility theory that seeks to incor-
porporate time preferences. EDU is a particular model of discounted utility theory, one
that picks a special form for modelling time preference. In what follows, let me describe
the general landscape of discounted utility theory and then show how Strotz lands on
EDU as the normatively correct model.
When navigating through life, you face many choices with outcomes distributed through-
out time: (e.g.) saving for retirement, suffering through a dentist visit, going to surf.
Following Strotz, think of these different paths as curves in a consumption-time diagram.
Each curve C(t) specifies a particular set of choices through some period 0 ≤ t ≤ T . We
assume that your preferences are sharp enough to let you transitively order all the differ-
ent alternatives you face, C1(t), C2(t), C3(t)... and that this ordering can be represented
by a utility functional Φτ . The subscript τ represents the evaluation time. We can think
of it as the present. Φτ specifies your ranking at the present time t = τ of consumption
paths through time .
Discounted utility theory is a simple extension of expected utility theory. To focus on
temporal discounting, it’s convenient to ignore the “expected” part of expected utility
theory and pretend that everything is certain. We also don’t want to have to trace
through time all the knock-on effects of choosing goods, experiences, and so, such as
the pleasant memories a vacation make provide. We’ll therefore focus on instantaneous
utility. The utility function u[C(t), t] thus assigns a value u(t) to C(t) for every time t.
To represent discounting Strotz proposes the function λ(t − τ). The present moment
is given by τ and time t is some date in the past or future of τ . The discount function
is thus a function of the distance between that date, say, New Year’s Day 2030, and the
present. Since we don’t discount the present, we assume that λ(0) = 1.
We can now state the goal of discounted utility theory, which is to maximize the utility
functional
6There are many authors who claim for a variety of different reasons that non-EDU discounting can
be rational; see in philosophy (e.g.,) Callender 2021a, Pettigrew 2020, and in social science (e.g.)
Burness 1976, Drouhin 2009, McGuire and Kable 2013.
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λ(t− τ)u[C(t), t]dt (1)
where the integrand factors into two functions, a discount function of (t−τ) and a utility
function of t.
Strotz carefully notes that (1) may depend on two types of discounting, discounting
from the present moment or from the calendar date of the future consumption. For
the latter, he gives the example of wanting champagne on his birthday; receiving it
afterwards is of much less value. This kind of (what philosophers will call) “impure”
temporal preference gets encoded in the utility function and not the discount function,
for the weight u(t) assigned to the pleasure of champagne is a function of calendar time
t. The value of the champagne will then be high when t=birthday and decline thereafter.
Equation (1) captures both types of time preference.
We wish to find the optimal plan forward from the present τ = 0. Assume that we
have a finite stock of some resources to be consumed. We want to maximize (1) subject
to constraints imposed by this stock, beginning at τ = 0, with endpoints given by t = 0
and t = T . Plugging in these constraints and sparing the math, the solution to this
differential equation is
λ(t) · ∂u[C(t), t]
∂C
= constant
where the constant is dependent upon the stock. In words, what this means is that
spreading the discounted marginal utility of the stock equally across time maximizes utility.
If our stock is water, we would have to take account of the diminishing utility of extra
increments of water – the first glass quenches thirst but later glasses aren’t as valuable –
and our time preference that makes a glass tomorrow less valuable than one tomorrow.
An optimal planner spreads this product evenly across time.
This result is restricted to a plan as seen from the present. What about consistency
across time? In this case we wish to find the optimal path through time at τ = 0,
reevaluating at some new present τ1, and then another τ2, and another, for all τ . Strotz
asks, “Under what circumstances will an individual who continuously re-evaluates his
planned course of consumption confirm his earlier choices and follow out the consumption
plan originally selected?” (171).
Again sparing the math, the answer is that consistency is achieved when one discounts
according to the exponential discount function
λ(t) = kt (2)
where k is a constant and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (2) makes one’s discounting constant and propor-
tionate to amounts of time. See Figure 2. The function is none other than the simple
discount function chosen by Samuelson. The model of discounted utility theory that in-
corporates the exponential discount rate (2) is called exponential discounted utility theory
(EDU). Strotz proves that (2) is the unique function that will lead to time consistent
choices. Any other may lead to preference reversals and possible exploitation.
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Figure 2: Exponential discounting. The amount discounted is proportional to the amount
of calendar time.
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Plugging (2) into (1), observe that the present time τ has vanished.
2.2 Tense and Strotz’s Result
The parameter τ represents tensed time in discounted utility theory. It stands for the time
of evaluation, the present moment for the decision-maker. The parameter t by contrast
runs over a timeline that represents earlier and later than relations amongst events.
Think of the timeline ordered by t as a map. Then τ is the red dot indicating “you are
(temporally) here.” In the language of philosophy of time, τ is an A-determination and
a particular instance of t is a B-determination.
Having recognized this, what immediately jumps out at us is the fact that equation
(2), the backbone of normatively charged EDU, lacks any reference to τ , and hence,
tensed time. When comparing two outcomes to be delivered at different times, the only
things that matter for an EDU discounter are (i) the tenseless distance between the two
outcomes and (ii) the different valuations of the outcomes. That’s it. Both (i) and (ii) are
entirely tenseless. Tense doesn’t matter at all when you are making a decision according
to EDU.
This result is at once surprising and not surprising at all. On the one hand, it’s
surprising because discounting is a thoroughly tensed affair. Except when discounting
for calendar date, what matters to the decision-maker is the delay from now. It’s alarming
that the “now” drops out. On the other hand, it’s not surprising that it does. That was
more or less the goal of the enterprise. Finding a rate that one will reaffirm, again
and again, is very close if not tantamount to finding a rate that doesn’t depend on
when is now. Strotz’s question demands that you stand by your evaluations in every
context, so it’s unsurprising that an evaluation that changes its truth-value depending
on a contextually supplied parameter (e.g., τ) is not permitted.
To be clear, EDU doesn’t do away with tense. We can’t accuse Strotz of taking tensed
discounting and then proving a result about something different–tenseless discounting.
The discounting he works with is explicitly tensed. It’s just that the tense drops out when
temporal consistency is demanded. The discount rate can make reference to a now, but
it has to be independent of when now happens to be. Tense isn’t ignored. It is forbidden
to matter in the representation of the answer due to the nature of the question.
I think it’s illuminating to view this central result in economics and rational choice
theory via tense. The result is saying tensed discounting is rational when its tense doesn’t
matter. This interpretation will help us connect EDU to debates about the philosophical
position known as temporal neutrality.
Two other features of this result as it relates to tensed time are interesting.
First, the utility function u[C(t), t] is solely a function of t and not τ . This is highly
significant. In the philosophical literature, many famous examples turn on tense matter-
ing to how much we value an outcome. In Parfit’s famous examples, we’re willing to trade
a small amount of future pain for more past pain. The intuition is that past pain is “over
and done” and therefore not something we care as much about as future pain. With u not
being a function of τ , we cannot represent this kind of change in value/care as a change
in utility. If you recall, Strotz gave the example of wanting champagne on his birthday,
9
which is some calendar time t. The utility conferred by the champagne can depend on
t, so birthday-champagne can be valued more than day-after-birthday champagne. A
similar dependence cannot happen for changing tensed perspective via τ , however, so
champagne-on-birthday in the past is valued the same as champagne-on-birthday in the
future.7
Second, the integrand (1) factors into two functions, a function of the temporal dis-
tance from now and a function of only calendar time. This means that there can be no
interaction effects between tensed discounting and calendar discounting. Yet arguably
there are. Maybe in 1980 when I was young I cared less about the past than I do now
in 2020; or perhaps in 2020 I will discount the future less sharply than in 2030 because
it matters more to me then.
3 EDU and the Past
The reader may wonder whether EDU can treat past discounting. The intuitive pull of
past discounting can be strong. In Parfit’s famous case, one wakes up in a hospital and
is told that either one has undergone a very painful surgery while conscious yesterday
or will undergo such a surgery tomorrow. You cannot remember yesterday due to an
amnesia pill you hav etaken. Yesterday’s surgery, if it happened, lasted for X hours;
tomorrow’s, if it happens, will last for Y hours. When asked, some people prefer to find
out that they already had the surgery, even if X >> Y (see Lee et al 2020). Can EDU
model this kind of preference?
In Strotz’s model we are looking at some period 0 ≤ t ≤ T and then assuming that
the first decision point is at τ = 0. So the whole time period covered is the future. This
treatment is very typical in economics. However, it is certainly possible to treat the past
in this model, and indeed, Strotz does. We can allow t to range over all of time and
pick τ to have any value of t we desire. Suppose we discretize time into years and let
the “first” moment of time be t = 0 and our first decision be 13 billion years later at
τ = t2021 = 2021. Then all t < τ is “the past.”
We now have a past but also a big problem. An exponential discounter will, for times
t < τ , value the past more than the present, and value the far past more than the near
past (Hedden 2015 also makes this point). That isn’t even close to descriptively accurate,
as that is more or less the opposite of what we do. In fact, it’s not past discounting at
all, but past inflation.
Perhaps one might impose a rule demanding exponential discounting away from time
t = τ in both temporal directions. Our concern would peak at t = τ and then fall away
exponentially toward the past ( t < τ) and future ( t > τ). Ignoring fit with actual data,
that at least would allow for past discounting in the model. Here we would be taking
advantage of the fact that Strotz’s model allows for future inflation as much as future
7This kind of phenomenon is true of non-temporal essentially indexical utilities too. I care more about
whether *I* get champagne than whether Craig Callender gets champagne. I care much more whether
the champagne is delivered *here* than whether it is delivered to the particular address in San Diego
County where I happen to be. And so on.
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Figure 3: Past discounting
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discounting: a curve that inflates the future, when shifted into the past, will discount
the past. The problem with this modified theory, however, is that it will face the same
problems non-exponential discounting did. This sharp “peak” about the present moment
would be non-exponential; and as the present moment updates, the discounting will not
be time consistent. The upshot is that although past discounting can be modeled in
discounted utility theory, there is no way to do so in a time consistent manner because
it is tensed.
Economics ignores past discounting. The common reason mentioned for this practice
is that the past is uncontrollable so we don’t need to consider decisions about it. That
is undoubtably true for most decisions considered in economics, but it is not as cost-
free a restriction as is sometimes thought. In philosophical thought experiments, for
instance, Doughtery 2011 shows that in concert with your other preferences – specifically,
risk aversion – past discounting can matter to the future. And more generally, past
discounting can matter in all sorts of practical matters. For instance, consider price
negotiation. Taking advantage of someone’s past discounting, I may be able to negotiate
a lower price for a service already rendered than one to be rendered. Still, since these
are not the sorts of problems for which economists use discounted utility theory, few will
lose sleep if they must ignore past discounting.
4 Two Types of Temporal Neutrality and EDU
The philosophical position of temporal neutrality can be traced back to ancient times.
In the modern period, one finds a clear expression in Adam Smith 1790. Smith holds
that the prudent person heeds the approbation of an “impartial spectator”:
The impartial spectator does not feel himself worn out by the present labour
of those whose conduct he surveys; nor does he feel himself solicited by the
importunate calls of their present appetites. To him their present, and what
is likely to be their future situation, are very nearly the same: he sees them
nearly at the same distance, and is affected by them very nearly in the same
manner.(VI.i.11)
Temporal neutrality is explicitly tied to rationality by Henry Sidgwick 1907, who writes
that
Indeed this equal and impartial concern for all parts of one’s conscious life is
perhaps the most prominent element in the common notion of the rational–as
opposed to the merely impulsive–pursuit of pleasure. (111)
and this position is endorsed by John Rawls, e.g., “The mere difference of location in
time, of something’s being earlier or later, is not in itself a rational ground for having
more or less regard for it” (Rawls 1971, 293-4). David Brink provides a recent succinct
statement of the position:
temporal neutrality should be understood to claim that the temporal lo-
cation of goods and harms within a life has no normative significance except
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insofar as it contributes to the value of that life. We might say that on this
view temporal location has no independent significance or no significance per
se. (358)
Advocates of temporal neutrality are not always clear about what kind of time series
– a tensed A-series or tenseless B-series – they mean when they refer to “temporal lo-
cation.” Location in what series? In the above quotes, Smith picks out A-properties
(present, future) whereas Rawls mentions B-properties (earlier, later). Rawls in the very
next sentence (not quoted) then switches to A-series language. This imprecision occurs
naturally in ordinary language depending on what is assumed in context. None of the
thinkers mentioned are concerned with temporal linguistics, so this kind of shifting back
and forth is perfectly natural. However, making the distinction allows us to distinguish
two types of temporal neutrality, one that denies that tensed location has independent
significance and one that denies that tenseless location has independent significance.
The tensed reading, I think, is the most natural understanding of temporal neutrality.
The motivation for the thesis in Smith, Sidgwick and most others is to advise people
not to give in to impulsive acts that satisfy the momentary present self. Instead the
temporal neutralist urges us to consider one’s overall good across one’s whole life. Much
of this literature is best interpreted as against what psychologists often call “present bias”.
Temporal neutralism’s recommendation of pursuing now-for-later sacrifices is thought to
be needed to counteract this tendency to inflate present value. It is not best interpreted
as counseling, say, 2025-for-later sacrifice, except when the now occurs in 2025. Strotz
speaks of the “intertemporal tussle” in which we all engage, the tension between what the
momentary self wants and what is good for the whole person extended throughout time.
Temporal neutralism is naturally understood as taking the side of the whole temporally
extended person. In so doing it rejects the importance of satisfying any particular time
slice of you except insofar as such satisfaction can be justified for the person as a whole.
Further evidence for thinking the tensed reading is standard comes from examining a
sophisticated neutralism, such as Brink’s, which allows that one may desire one’s life to
have certain temporal patterns. For instance, maybe you prefer a rags-to-riches life to
a riches-to-rags life (Velleman 1991). If so, then you prefer to distribute your resources
toward the later moments of your life than the earlier. You’re willing to sacrifice earlier-
for-later more than later-for-earlier. This pattern is entirely compatible with neutralism.
The reason why they’re compatible, I would say, is that these second-order temporal
preferences are all tenseless temporal preferences. They are condoned by Smith’s impar-
tial spectator looking over your entire life. What is anti-neutralist is a preference that
depends upon where one is presently located in one’s lifetime. Where the “red dot” is on
your worldline should not matter if you’re a neutralist. In other words, tense should not
matter.
A tenseless reading is also possible. In this case the temporal location that has no
significance is a location in the B-series. This reading is fine but it does make temporal
neutrality trickier to defend than the tensed variety. The reason is that it’s very hard to
disentangle B-location and non-temporal significance. B-location almost always matters:
one location is your birthday, in another you’re young, in another you’re old, in another
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you’re in a different country, and so on. That it’s okay to discount the value of receiving
champagne after your birthday has passed is agreed to be acceptable by everyone. To find
the controversial discounting, one needs to abstract away from all of these “impurities”
and isolate cases of B-theoretic discounting that are pure. What one is left with is a
person who has a kind of fetish for a particular calendar date, like a tenseless version of
Parfit’s example of a man who, all else being equal, prefers his pain on Tuesdays. (Parfit’s
example is about future Tuesdays, not later Tuesdays.) One can certainly object to this
kind of preference. But this question really has more to do with how “Humean” one is
about the permissibility of preferences and less about time per se. If temporal neutrality
is about this kind of discounting being irrational then it’s hard to see what all the fuss
is about – there aren’t many of these “ideally coherent eccentrics” (Street 2009) walking
around.8
EDU can model both types of discounting. We’ve already seen that Strotz encodes
tensed discounting in the temporal discounting function and represents tenseless dis-
counting by allowing the utility to be a function of calendar time t. Suppose we accept
that, however one defines temporal neutrality, its core commitment is to tensed time
not having significance. Viewed this way, we can see that EDU builds in a kind of tem-
poral neutrality. It sanctions those temporal preferences that cannot be exploited and
that maximize utility along a lifetime. And in particular, as we saw, tense drops out of
optimal discounting.
Perhaps surprisingly, this allows some future discounting. Suppose you’re offered a
small reward now or a larger reward next week. Should you take the smaller sooner
reward? EDU doesn’t condemn you if you do. It doesn’t judge preferences. But it does
say that if you do accept the more immediate reward, your position on your timeline
shouldn’t be relevant. So if you take the smaller sooner reward now, you should also take
the smaller sooner award if the choice is between rewards spaced one year from now and
a year and a week from now. The discounting is only a function of two differences, (big
reward - small reward) and (late date - soon date). If you discount, it’s okay so long as
you always do it the same way. “When” you are therefore doesn’t matter. This is a kind
of discounting that an ideal spectator could endorse.
We now see that EDU is more or less committed to temporal neutralism being the
normatively correct story. The Appendix goes through the logic linking temporal neu-
tralism and EDU (and see Callender 2021b for more detail and discussion, including a
derivation of EDU from temporal neutrality). But the main point is that what at first
looked like a tension between many philosophers and economists is in fact a consilience.9
8Greene 2021 argues that preferences partly based on pure time preferences are objectionable. In this
way he hopes to avoid disentangling pure from impure preferences and make his recommendations
widely applicable. See Callender 2021b for some thoughts on this maneuver.
9I’ve spelled out temporal neutralism in two ways that I consider natural, neutral about position in
the A-series and neutral about position in the B-series. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t other
ways of doing so that are strong enough to eliminate any type of future discounting whatsoever. For
instance, one might insist on being neutral about the relative delays from the evaluation point, so
that if one preferred reward x to y when spaced apart by temporal distance ∆t, then one prefers x
to y no matter what ∆t′ is. That would eliminate discounting altogether and regain a disagreement
between some economists and philosophers. Still, I’ve shown that on at least once natural way of
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5 Hyperbolic Discounting and Tense
Strotz states that people are not actually exponential discounters. With great prescience,
he develops models of how we do discount that are now called hyperbolic discounting.
Many decades after Strotz, with interest from psychology and the rise of behavioral
economics, empirical study after empirical study demonstrated conclusively that we are
not exponential discounters. We are said to be “hyperbolic” discounters instead because
some of the models suggested to fit the data include a discount function with a hyperbolic
or quasi-hyperbolic form. Scores of different “hyperbolic” discounting models have been
proposed.10 None fit all the data, but each typically has some kind of rationale (e.g. the
uncertainty of hazards) accompanying it that attempts to explain why decision-makers
would employ it.
A kind of familiar narrative emerged. Dual process theory developed in the heuristics
and biases tradition of work on judgements. That tradition, begun by Tversky and
Kahneman (see e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981), showed that we often violate expected
utility theory in our reasoning; for example, we commonly commit probabilistic fallacies.
Dual process theory arose as the explanation for these “anomalous” departures from the
normative standard of reasoning. As the name suggests, it proposes two types of mental
processing, system 1 and system 2. System 2 is our cool, rational system. It is typically
slow, reflective and conscious. System 1 is our “lower” more intuitive system. It is
typically connected to the emotions, fast, heuristic, and unconscious. The exponential
versus hyperbolic debate was fit to this narrative (see, e.g., Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
2005). Exponential discounting is seen as the work of rational system 2 processing,
whereas the present bias of emotional system 1 is understood as bending the exponential
curve toward the hyperbolic in greedy service of immediate needs.
Challenges to this picture have arisen from many quarters. As mentioned, many dis-
agree that EDU is the right normative standard for discounting, but others have also
questioned whether dual process theory is a suitable expanatory model (see, e.g., Samuel
2009, Pennycook 2017).
It’s eye-opening to view this debate through the lens of tense.
As mentioned, there are scores of different hyperbolic functions proposed. Many
have remarked that “hyperbolic” discounting is better characterized as simply “non-
exponential” discounting. But the differences amongst these functions won’t matter
much for us. Consider the functional form of the simplest and most canonical of forms
λ(t− τ) = (1 + α(t− τ))−β (3)
where α and β are constants. We notice immediately that τ is back!11
understanding temporal neutrality, the dispute goes away.
10See Thaler 1981, Loewenstein and Prelec 1992, Laibson 1997, Loewenstein and Donoghue 2005 and
Sozou 1998 for a start.
11Not seeing this function always written this way, the reader may suspect that it is back only because I
put it back. It’s true that some presentations of hyperbolic discounting present a function like that in
(3) lacking the τ . However, when actually used, careful discussions of hyperbolic discounting always
distinguish between calendar (or date) time and delay time, and it is not at all controversial that
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Tense is crucial to hyperbolic discounting. Let’s see how this works with a simple
example. Suppose that you don’t like cleaning the gutters of your house. You’re won-
dering when to do it, where in the example time is discrete and the units are days. You
do not discount today, λ(0) = 1, but you do today care less about its cost tomorrow,
i.e., λ(1) < 1. If you were an exponential discounter, then we know that the tensed day






because a day’s wait is a day’s wait, no matter when it happens. If you are a hyperbolic
discounter, the tensed day does matter to you; in fact, it can matter quite a lot. Let
α = β = 1. You still do not discount today, so λ(0) = 1. But you discount cleaning
the gutters tomorrow by λ(1) = (1 + 1)−1 = 1/2. You dislike cleaning the gutters today
twice as much as doing it tomorrow because λ(0)/λ(1) = 2. Because of the presence of
τ in (3), the ratio between cleaning the gutters a year from now versus a year and a day





and in fact you don’t much care between these two distant days because λ(365)/λ(366) =
1.003. Your hatred of gutter cleaning flattens out from today.
When put in terms of something valued (say, a cash reward) versus disvalued (say,
cleaning the gutters), this “flattening out” is characterized as diminishing impatience.
Diminishing impatience is often regarded as the central feature of hyperbolic discounting.
And indeed, it is important, for one wants to fit the empirical data that displays such
diminishing impatience. What is absolutely crucial to getting the intended “hyperbolic”
behavior, however, is the inclusion of the present, τ . The tensed present is the source of
the famous violations of temporal consistency. When we fast forward a year, you will view
cleaning the gutters tomorrow (what used to be Day 366) as twice as good as cleaning
them today (what used to be Day 365), not merely 1.003x better. A clever gutter cleaning
service might in principle be able to exploit the changing values of λ(365)/λ(366) you
suffer as these dates draw near. Whether this temporal inconsistency is really a sign of
irrationality is a matter of great debate, as mentioned.12 Rational or not, since people
do display this pattern of behavior, descriptively adequate models need to incorporate
tense.
As Rasmussen 2008 points out, one can be a temporally consistent yet non-exponential
discounter so long as (in my terminology) the discounting is tenseless. Suppose that you
hyperbolic time essentially employs both. As Rasmusen 2008 notes, where his “relativistic” time is my
tensed time, “Hyperbolic discounting makes not one but two changes from the standard model. First,
it makes the per-period discount rate change over time. Second, it bases discounting on relativistic
time rather than absolute time. It is this second assumption which is the key one.”
12For one, the claim that it is irrational assumes that nothing happened in that intervening time that
allows you to rationally change your mind (it assumes that a condition know as Invariance (see
Appendix) holds and that it is normatively warranted). See Callender 2021a, Halevy 2015, Janssens,
Kramer, and Swart 2017, and Pettigrew 2020.
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discount at a rate of 5% during the decade [2029, 2039] and then switch to 10% during
[2040, 2050]. Perhaps you wish to discount more when you are older. This discounting
is non-exponential because non-constant. So long as it is understood as about tenseless
calendar dates, however, it causes no problem or inconsistency. Cleaning the gutters in
2038 gets discounted at 5% and cleaning them in 2045 gets discounted at 10%. But if
I know that now, I can calculate those values, plug them into my utility function, and
generate no inconsistency so long as I stick to my plan and keep cleaning the gutters in
those two years discounted as I did originally. Rasmussen puts his finger precisely on
what matters:
The key is that exponential discounting treats the parameter as “Ras-
musen’s rate of time preference for when he is 70 in the year 2058” whereas
non-exponential discounting treats it as “Rasmusen’s rate of time preference
for 21 years from the present.”
What matters is tense. Tense is what allows the discounting of a future event to change
as we approach it.
This point explains what might otherwise be confusing: the pheneomenon of time-
consistent hyperbolic discounting. Drouhin 2015 and Burness 1976 emphasize that con-
trary to conventional wisdom hyperbolic discounting can be consistent. Their trick is to
make calendar time and evaluation time multiplicatively separable in the discount factor.
Without going into the details, this leads to a discount rate that declines in calendar time
t and is independent of the evaluation time. The same goes for Weitzman 2001’s famous
use of a declining social discount rate. Both types of model employ non-constant dis-
counting but avoid inconsistency because their hyperbolic functions aren’t a function of
evaluation time.13 Put in my terms, they don’t lead to preference reversal because they
are not a function of tense. Constant discounting leads to time consistent exponential
discounting, but that doesn’t mean non-constant discounting leads to time inconsistency:
crucially one needs that function to also be a function of tensed perspective.14
The great debate between exponential and hyperbolic discounting is thus a debate
between tenseless and tensed discounting. As philosophers have noticed with intuition
pumps and as behavioral economists and psychologists have empirically demonstrated,
the folk discount in a tensed way. Temporal neutrality and the desire to maximize utility
over a lifetime and not at a time, however, lead some philosophers and economists to
hold that tenseless discounting is the only one that can be rational. The debate within
the hyperbolic discounting camp is about the form of the function; but the larger debate
is really over whether this function is tensed or not. In this debate on the rationality of
13The discount rate in Drouhin 2015 and Burness 1976 is ρ(t) = αβ/(1+αt) where α and β are constants
and t is calendar time. Weitzman’s discount rate aggregates individual rates that disagree. His
function can be written as ρ(t) = µ/1+σ2
µ
·t where µ is the mean and σ the standard deviation of
individual discount rates. What’s important for us is that although hyperbolic and declining, the
evaluation time τ drops out in both cases, just as it does in Strotz’s result.
14In the terms used in the Appendix, these models maintain consistency by violating stationarity and in-
variance. The violation of stationarity is what makes them hyperbolic, and the violation of invariance
means that they “care” about calendar time.
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future discounting we see an echo of the debate in philosophy over the rationality of past
discounting. Both are debates about the rationality of discounting for tense.
6 Conclusion
This paper hasn’t resolved any of the big debates regarding tense and rationality. I hope
that it’s made progress, nonetheless, by bringing the social science and philosophy on
temporal preferences closer to one another. On its face, it looks like work in social science
and philosophy are in sharp disagreement over the rationality of the two different types of
temporal discounting. But when we peer at the debates through the lens of tense, we find
more in common than first meets the eye. EDU is a version of temporal neutralism. In
fact, it is essentially implied by the conjunction of expected utility theory and temporal
neutrality (see Appendix; Callender 2021b). Temporal neutralists often take themselves
to be against temporal discounting; but we’ve seen that EDU allows only a kind of
tenseless discounting, a type of discounting that arguably is consistent with the spirit of
neutralism. Regarding past discounting, philosophers divide on whether it is rational.
Temporal neutralists think it is not whereas others side with the strength of the intuition.
EDU, we’ve seen, doesn’t really treat past discounting, but if one tries to incorporate
it then it won’t be judged as rational. So EDU sides with temporal neutralists on past
discounting, as it more or less does on future discounting. Just as philosophy divides on
past discounting, we saw that social science divides on the rationality of EDU. The great
debate between exponential and hyperbolic discounting, we saw, is very much a dispute
over the rationality of discounting for tense.
By drawing past and future discounting together under the umbrella of tense, I am not
suggesting that they are the same sorts of thing. They are both tensed; through this lens
the debates on rationality in social science and philosophy line up closer than ordinarily
conceived. In this important way they are alike. But I make no claim about whether they
stem from the same source, whether they have the same kind of explanation, and so on.
Although I suspect they are deeply linked via the situated momentary self (Ismael 2017,
Callender 2017), I believe that they are otherwise quite different in many respects. Do
they treat hedonic and non-hedonic experiences alike? Positive and negative valanced
events? Experienced and unexperienced events? Does each asymmetry extend to the
third person? Are they associated with emotion in the same way? As many of the
chapters in this volume demonstrate, psychologists and experimental philosophers are
just beginning to probe these two asymmetries. What they’ve found so far is that our
discounting behavior is extraordinarily complex. Given the vast differences between the
future, which is viewed as inherently risky, for instance, and the past, which is not viewed
as risky, it’s hard to believe that this web of preferences and behavior will turn out to
be the same for the two types of preferences.
That said, now that we can see clearly just how important tense is and how both
social science and philosophy are debating the rationality of discounting for tense, this
paper does suggest that future research on the origin of our tensed model of the world
may be important. Parfit famously tried to justify tensed (past) discounting via a tensed
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metaphysics. He had a very hard time doing so.15 Perhaps if we better understood the
role of tense , however, we could make more progress.16
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Appendix: The Logic of Temporal Preferences
Let’s see that not caring about tenseless calendar date and not caring about tensed
temporal perspective together more or less imply EDU (Callender 2021b). A key axiom
of EDU is stationarity. When axiomatized, EDU is essentially expected utility theory
plus stationarity (Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982). Modifying the terminology of Halevy
2015 to suit our purposes, consider outcomes x, y ∈ X, whose values are real numbers,
and t, t′ ∈ T , the set of times, such that 0 ≤ t, t′, and delays ∆2, ∆1 ≥ 0. Then a set of
preferences is stationary if at time t = τ
Stationarity (x, t+∆1) ∼τ (y, t+∆2)⇐⇒ (x, t′ +∆1) ∼τ (y, t′ +∆2).
where ∼τ represents indifference at time t = τ . When an agent with stationary prefer-
ences ranks options, her decision depends only on the values of the outcomes (x versus
y) and the delay between the two outcomes (∆2 − ∆1). See Figure 4. An exponential
discounter represents someone whose preferences satisfy stationarity. Put in tensed lan-
guage, right now, at time t = τ , the decision maker has preferences such that neither the
calendar date nor the distance from the present matter to the decision-maker.
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Figure 4: Stationarity: Let the horizontal line represent a tenseless timeline, the dot the
evaluation point or Now, S a small reward and L a large reward. A set of pref-
erences that is indifferent between the top and bottom situations is stationary.
Someone might violate stationarity by caring about the calendar date on which the
reward was delivered. Add dates to the timeline of Figure 4. Then you can see that
such a concern will cause you to violate the condition. Note that although violations of
stationary are often associated with preference reversals and inconsistency, that is not
accurate. Since the preferences are only elicited at time time t = τ there is no reversal
nor any dynamic inconsistency. At best one might say that a violation of stationarity
sets one up for inconsistency.
Dynamic consistency requires two evaluation times. We can say a set of preferences at
times t = τ and time t = τ ′ satisfies are consistent if
Consistency (x, t+∆1) ∼τ (y, t+∆2)⇐⇒ (x, t+∆1) ∼τ ′ (y, t+∆2).
Consistency looks like stationarity, but note the crucial τ ′ in the second preference re-
lation. Consistent time preferences mean that one’s preferences over temporal outcomes
don’t change as the present moves from t = τ to t = τ ′, where τ ′ > τ . See Figure 5.
Suppose that in 2020 one prefers a large later reward in 13 months to a smaller one in
12 months; if time consistent, then one still prefers the larger later reward even when it
is only 1 month away compared to the immediate small reward. Violating consistency is
to genuinely reverse preferences, which in principle can be exploited. In terms of tense,
Consistency can be understood as one’s preferences being insensitive to the tensed “flow
of time,” i.e., your preferences remain the same despite the “orange dot” sliding along
the timeline.
A third notion, invariance, acts as a kind of bridge between stationarity and consis-
tency. A set of preferences is time invariant if
Invariance (x, t+∆1) ∼τ (y, t+∆2)⇐⇒ (x, t′ +∆1) ∼τ ′ (y, t′ +∆2)
where t = τ and time t′ = τ ′. With invariance, we slide the now along with everything
else. It tests whether preferences are invariant under a time translation that includes the
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Figure 5: Consistency: Let the horizontal line represent a tenseless timeline, the dot the
evaluation point or Now, S a small reward and L a large reward. A set of
preferences that is indifferent between the top and bottom situations satisfies
consistency.
tensed now. Since the “now” moves, this condition tests whether any moment of time in
the B-series has a special character or status. See Fig. 6. Invariance is the claim that
“preferences are not a function of calendar time” (Halevy 2015, 341). One might violate
invariance if he or she cared about particular dates, as in Strotz’s example of caring about
receiving champagne on the date of his birthday, or simply for some arbitrary reason.
Halevy 2015 states a beautifully simple relationship amongst the three temporal con-
ditions, consistency, stationarity, and invariance, namely:
Any two implies the third.
The proof is trivial.
This small theorem allows us some insight into what is going on regarding tense. Recall
that stationarity more or less implies (if we assume the rest of expected utility theory)
exponential discounting. Due to the above theorem, we know that invariance and consis-
tency together imply stationarity. Invariance, we saw, is the condition that preferences
are insensitive to calendar time. Consistency meanwhile is the condition that preferences
are insensitive to flowing tensed time. Together they imply stationarity, a condition
saying that your preferences at a time are sensitive to neither tensed time nor calendar
time. As a representation of stationary time preferences, exponential discounting is just
that, representing a decision-maker who at a time cares about neither calendar time nor
tensed time.
Put the other way around, the theorem implies that a violation of one condition im-
plies a violation of one or both of the others. Hence ¬(stationarity) → ¬(consistency)
v ¬(invariance). This means that we might violate stationarity (and EDU) because
the tensed flow of time does matter to one’s preferences (a violation of consistency) or
because the calendar date matters (a violation of Invariance), or both. For the experi-
mental literature on temporal discounting, this permutation is very interesting because
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Figure 6: Invariance: Let the horizontal line represent a tenseless timeline, the dot the
evaluation point or Now, S a small reward and L a large reward. A set of
preferences that is indifferent between the top and bottom situations satisfies
invariance.
the smaller-sooner versus larger-later experimental paradigm typically tests at only one
time and elicits violations of stationarity. That does not imply a violation of consistency,
however, unless we do tests at two times and demonstrate that invariance holds; other-
wise the violation may be due to non-invariant preferences. And indeed, the few studies
that have tests at two times have found that many decision-makers do violate Invari-
ance (Halevy 2015, Janssens, Kramer, and Swart 2017), thereby showing that dynamical
inconsistency cannot be assumed to follow from a failure of stationarity.
Another permutation is interesting: consistency plus calendar time not mattering (in-
variance) implies that tenses don’t matter. This is more or less the argument for temporal
neutrality. Temporal neutrality prizes dynamical consistency. Inconsistency threatens
utility maximization across a lifetime and can be exploited. And temporal neutralists
often ignore “positional” features as impure, such as in the example of Strotz’s birthday.
Calendar dates are therefore bracketed and invariance assumed (in this regard see Steele
2021). These two assumptions, we now see, are strong enough logically to entail that
tenses shouldn’t matter.
Finally, we saw that temporal neutrality can be understood in two ways, depending
upon what time series we use, a tensed or tenseless one. Invariance states that calendar
time doesn’t matter. Consistency states that tensed doesn’t matter. Suppose we embrace
both senses of temporal neutrality. Then both invariance and consistency are assumed
to hold; from which, EDU essentially follows.
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